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I. INTRODUCTION 
On the eve of the millennium, with fireworks setting off in stages around the 
world, the prospects for section 2(b) of the Charter1 were not so bright. Too many 
times, in decisions which include Libman v. Quebec (Attorney General)2 and R. v. 
Lucas,3 the Supreme Court of Canada accepted limits on expressive freedom when 
the activity in question was not considered valuable enough to warrant the 
Charter‟s protection. Nor did one of its final decisions under section 2(b) in the last 
century, Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), displace the 
assumptions of a values methodology, though a majority found there that 
Parliament‟s ban on opinion polls was not justifiable.4 
_______________________________________________________________ 
* Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School. The author would like to thank Mr. 
Christopher Bredt and Mr. Adam Dodek, both of Borden Ladner Gervais LLP, for commenting on an 
earlier draft. The author wishes to acknowledge the release of copyright by the Canadian Bar 
Association. This paper was reproduced from conference materials published in The Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms: Twenty Years Later, in 2001. 
1
  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
2
 Libman v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569 (invalidating Quebec‟s 
referendum restrictions on associational and expressive freedom, and inviting the province to re-legislate 
and impose strict limits on third party participation in referendum elections). 
3
 [1998] 1 S.C.R. 439 (with the exception of s. 299(c), upholding ss. 298, 299 and 300 of the 
Criminal Code prohibiting defamatory libel). 
4
 Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 877 (invalidating 
Parliament‟s opinion poll blackout in the final days of a federal election campaign). The evolution of the 
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At present, then, the question is whether there is any reason to believe that the 
prospects for expressive freedom have improved. Since autumn of 2000, the 
Supreme Court of Canada has decided three significant cases under section 2(b) of 
the Charter.5 While two of the three decisions, Little Sisters and Sharpe, accorded 
free expression a modicum of protection, Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), 
which was the first of the three, was not dispositive on the merits. Still, it is 
difficult to discount the latter decision on procedural grounds. There, in the context 
of an interlocutory proceeding, all members of the Court but Mr. Justice Major 
uncritically conceded restrictions on political expression when at its zenith during a 
federal election campaign. As for Little Sisters, the majority opinion admitted that 
egregious Charter violations had occurred at the Canada-United States border and 
then concluded that the unconstitutional implementation of customs legislation did 
not compromise the law itself. Finally, the decision in Sharpe embarked on an 
extraordinary exercise in statutory construction and judicial amendment to 
transform the Criminal Code‟s child pornography provisions into a model of 
respect for expressive freedom. To summarize, the Court was given the 
opportunity to enforce the guarantee in each case, and declined to do so in all 
three.6 
On the strength of early returns, the prognosis for expressive freedom is not 
especially positive, but nor is it wholly negative. Consistently with the past, the 
Court‟s initial decisions in the new millennium disclose an uneven conception of 
expressive freedom, one that is as uncertain and ambivalent as ever. After briefly 
suggesting the shortcomings of the pre-millennium jurisprudence, this paper takes 
a closer look at the trilogy of Harper, Little Sisters, and Sharpe. On the one hand, 
it laments the Court‟s lack of commitment to the expressive freedom, both as 
individual judges and as an institution. It may be a fresh century, but the 
opportunity for a fresh start under section 2(b) may already have been lost. On the 
other hand, though, the dissenting opinions in Harper and Little Sisters are 
encouraging. In addition, the Court should be given credit for granting expressive 
freedom some protection in Little Sisters and Sharpe. The qualification, however, 
is that in each case its support for the guarantee was seconded to strategic 
_______________________________________________________________ 
“values methodology” is analyzed and critiqued in Cameron, “The Past, Present, and Future of 
Expressive Freedom under the Charter” (1997), 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1, at 7-27. 
5
 Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 764 (granting the government‟s 
application to stay the injunction against enforcement of provisions of the Canada Elections Act); Little 
Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120, 2000 SCC 69 
(conceding that customs officers violated the Charter but declining to invalidate the statutory provision in 
question); and R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45, 2001 SCC 2 (upholding the Criminal Code‟s child 
pornography provisions). 
6
 Note, though, that in Little Sisters, the Court found the reverse onus clause in section 152(3) 
of the Customs Act unconstitutional, and held that it should not be construed or applied to require an 
importer to establish that goods are not obscene. Supra, note 5, at para. 154. 
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considerations. Specifically, the Court sought to minimize the institutional 
consequences of protecting expressive freedom by declining to invalidate the 
impugned legislative provisions. To the extent section 2(b) gained ground in these 
decisions, the question is whether principle was sacrificed in the process.  
II. THE PRE-MILLENNIUM JURISPRUDENCE 
There is a divide in the Supreme Court of Canada‟s conception of expressive 
freedom, with access on one side and content on the other. Though some have 
failed, it is fair to say that the Supreme Court has been more sympathetic to claims 
which implicate access or accountability values, or which otherwise advance the 
interests of the listener.7 By contrast, the Court has been discernibly less 
enthusiastic when a speaker seeks Charter protection for expression that is 
considered unpleasant or distasteful.8 There, and with few exceptions, content-
based claims have failed in almost every case the Court has considered.9 In 
Canada, it seems, expressive freedom is prized when it reinforces conventional 
_______________________________________________________________ 
7
 See, e.g., Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326 
(invalidating a publication ban, largely on the strength of the public‟s right of access to information about 
court proceedings); Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 (modifying the 
common law‟s balancing of interests between fair trial and a free press, again to improve the public‟s 
access to information about criminal proceedings); and Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick 
(Attorney General), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480 (vindicating the principle of openness in court proceedings); see 
also Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 (protecting commercial expression under 
the Charter, in part, because of the listener‟s or consumer‟s right to receive information); Rocket v. Royal 
College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 232 (supporting the public‟s right of access to 
advertising and information about dental services); RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 
[1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 (invalidating restrictions on tobacco advertising that denied consumers information 
about the properties of different brands of cigarettes); Thomson Newspapers, supra, note 4 
(characterizing voters as rational beings who are entitled to last minute polling information about the 
relative support for competing parties and candidates); and U.F.C.W., Local 1518 v. KMart Canada Ltd., 
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 1083 (supporting secondary picketing activities in order that the public receive 
information about the issues at stake in a labour dispute). 
8
 See, e.g., R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (upholding the Criminal Code‟s hate propaganda 
provisions); Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892 (upholding Human Rights 
Act provisions prohibiting the communication of discriminatory opinions); R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 
(upholding the Criminal Code‟s obscenity provision); Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 
S.C.R. 1130 (refusing to modify the common law of defamation on the ground that defamatory statements 
have low value); Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825 (upholding a human 
rights legislation complaint against a schoolteacher who expressed anti-Semitic views outside the classroom); 
Libman, supra, note 2; and R. v. Lucas, supra, note 3.  
9
 Counter-examples include: R. v. Zundel, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731 (invalidating the Criminal 
Code‟s false news provision in a prosecution for Holocaust denial); and RJR-MacDonald, supra, note 7 
(invalidating Parliament‟s absolute ban on tobacco advertising).  
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views and otherwise limited whenever unpopular views can be dismissed as 
valueless, and thereby silenced or punished. 
The Supreme Court‟s reaction to anti-Semitism, sexually explicit materials, 
defamatory statements and certain kinds of advertisements, both commercial and 
political, undercuts Irwin Toy‟s promise that the Charter would protect the freedom 
of expression, even and perhaps especially when it offends.10 The hypocrisy of 
section 2(b)‟s pre-millennium jurisprudence crystallized in a section 1 analysis that 
unapologetically invoked subjective perception to dilute the requirements of 
justification. Referred to, neutrally, as the contextual approach, that methodology 
asked whether the expressive activity was valuable or not, and relied on a negative 
assessment of its content to diminish the Charter‟s protection of expression. That 
approach quite possibly reached its zenith in R. v. Lucas,11 with the Court‟s 
conclusion there that protecting reputation is so imperative that defamation can be 
punished by a jail sentence. 
Though orthodoxy and freedom might never co-exist in comfort, the Court 
attempted to forge a compromise between the two through the Charter‟s bifurcation 
of breach and justification. While Irwin Toy‟s principle of neutrality governed the 
question of breach, the values methodology determined the justifiability of content-
based limits under section 1; that, for the most part, was the pattern of the pre-
millennium jurisprudence. As the new century turned into sight, the contradiction 
between the entitlement that section 2(b) recognized and section 1‟s focus on the 
redeeming value of expression remained intact. 
As well, the divide between access and content in the jurisprudence exposed a 
conception of the right that is driven and controlled, not in particular by the 
speaker‟s entitlement but rather, by third party interests. Under that vision of the 
guarantee, claims based on access and accountability reinforce the right to receive 
information and, accordingly, enjoy a relatively high rate of success. Meantime, 
those that assert the freedom to espouse reproachful views are subject to the 
interests of third parties not to be confronted with or influenced by 
communications perceived as undesirable or uninvited. Whether the section 2(b) 
claim was based on access or content, third party interests were paramount to the 
speaker‟s entitlement in the Court‟s pre-millennium jurisprudence. 
Returning to the guarantee‟s evolution, it is a point of no small interest, then, 
that Thomson Newspapers straddled the divide.12 The case implicated access and 
accountability values because Parliament‟s opinion poll blackout denied voters 
information during the final stages of a democratic election. Even so, the section 
2(b) claim was awkward given the Court‟s conclusion in Libman that strict limits 
_______________________________________________________________ 
10
 Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, at 968. 
11
  Supra, note 3. 
12
 Supra, note 4. 
(2001), 14 S.C.L.R. (2d) Expressive Freedom 71 
 
 
 
on third party participation in democratic elections are constitutionally permissible. 
In the Quebec referendum case, the Supreme Court unanimously held that 
restrictions on the speaker‟s right to enter the forum of public debate are justifiable 
because third parties might dominate, manipulate or influence the democratic 
process. Put in simple terms, Libman viewed non-party groups and individuals as 
intruders, and a distorting influence in a forum that has traditionally been 
controlled by the political parties. Far from being beneficial, in Libman the 
prospect of more information and debate during an election was considered 
counterproductive.13 
At least as to the government‟s interest in preventing distortion, manipulation 
and undue influence, much the same could be said about access to last minute 
opinion polls. That may explain why Gonthier J. relied on Libman in his dissenting 
opinion in Thomson Newspapers. For the majority, however, Bastarache J. found a 
way to avoid open conflict between the third party spending and opinion poll 
issues. In doing so, he managed to support voter access to opinion polls without 
undercutting the assumptions of a methodology that frowns on expressive activity 
whose content is unlikeable. By distinguishing precedents that based section 1‟s 
protection of expression on subjective assessments of what is good or bad and 
valuable or valueless, Bastarache J. was able to avoid Libman‟s force as 
precedent.14 Unlike Irwin Toy, Keegstra, Butler, Ross, and Libman, the issue at 
stake in Thomson Newspapers did not concern the government “intervening against 
a powerful interest to prevent expression from being a means of manipulation and 
oppression.”15 
In relying on that distinction, Bastarache J. further entrenched the dichotomy 
between expressive activity that can be regulated because it is mean or 
manipulative and therefore irrational, and that which is “rational” or informational, 
like opinion polls, and cannot be so easily limited. For that reason the federal 
government could not justifiably withhold information and thereby frustrate the 
voters‟ right to know. Though Thomson Newspapers was correctly decided, it 
should be noted just the same that “scientific” polling information and the 
“rational” voter are not especially in need of section 2(b)‟s protection. Rather, it is 
expressive activity whose content is disliked, dismissed or feared that is susceptible 
_______________________________________________________________ 
13
 The anomaly of Libman is that the Court struck Quebec‟s extreme restrictions on voter 
participation in the referendum debate but, in doing so, strongly supported the view that limits on 
participation serve, rather than compromise, democratic values. Libman, supra, note 2, at para. 41 
(stating that restrictions are democratic and egalitarian because affluent members of society are 
prevented from exerting a disproportionate influence and dominating the referendum debate), and at 
para. 47 (suggesting that limits on participation are necessary to guarantee that voters are adequately 
informed). 
14
 Thomson Newspapers, supra, note 4, at para. 114. 
15
 Id. 
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to censorship by the state.16 In the end, Thomson Newspapers was an easy case that 
did not significantly advance or alter the Court‟s section 2(b) methodology.17 
III. THE NEW MILLENNIUM 
Fortuitously, events brought expressive freedom onto the Supreme Court‟s 
docket early in the new millennium and, given changes in the Court‟s composition, 
it was not impossible to hope for a fresh start under section 2(b).18 It should be 
noted, though, that two of the trilogy decisions, Little Sisters and Sharpe, fell on 
the content side of the divide where the Court had been less receptive, historically, 
to the claim. As for Harper and third party participation in election campaigns, 
Libman pointed the Court in one direction and Thomson Newspapers, at least 
potentially, in another. 
1. Harper v. Canada (Attorney General)19 
Largely overlooked in the fanfare of Sharpe and Little Sisters is the Supreme 
Court of Canada‟s brief decision in Harper. Though the issue was interlocutory, 
the decision is important: with Major J. dissenting alone, the Court concluded that 
the Alberta Court of Appeal erred in issuing an injunction to bar the Canada 
Elections Act being enforced during autumn 2000‟s federal election campaign. 
Specifically, the provisions that were challenged set new limits on third party 
participation.20 
In opposing the injunction, the federal government introduced no concrete 
evidence to demonstrate that the balance of convenience favoured enforcement of 
the legislation over its non-enforcement.21 That did not deter the Court from 
_______________________________________________________________ 
16
 This paragraph is taken, in the main, from Cameron, “Horse Race of Another Kind: Libman, 
Thomson Newspapers, and „Rational Choice‟ ” (1999), 7 Canada Watch 106, at 113. 
17
 In that regard it should be noted that Thomson Newspapers did reinforce a stronger 
application of the final proportionality test, and is doctrinally important for that reason. Supra, note 4, at 
paras. 123-130. 
18
 Since the decisions in Lucas and Libman, Mr. Justice Bastarache joined the Court; since 
Thomson Newspapers, Binnie, Arbour and LeBel JJ. likewise joined the Court; as well, Beverley 
McLachlin became Chief Justice of Canada in the interim between Thomson Newspapers and the 
millennium trilogy. 
19
 Supra, note 5. 
20
 Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c. 9, s. 350 (allowing increased expenditures by third party 
participants but imposing limits nonetheless). 
21
 Three issues are relevant to the granting of an injunction: there must be a serious issue to be 
tried; the applicant must be at risk of suffering irreparable harm without the injunction; and, the balance 
of convenience must favour the applicant. The judge at first instance found that the Attorney General of 
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concluding that the public interest would be served by “maintaining in place the 
duly enacted legislation….” To support that view the Court referred to “the partial 
limitation on freedom of expression imposed by the restrictions.”22 It also stated 
that there is a presumption on such motions that the law is “directed to the public 
good and serves a valid public purpose,” and further indicated that the prospect of 
a Charter violation was insufficient to displace that assumption.23 As a result of that 
reasoning, eight of nine judges were unmoved by the argument that the legislation 
stifled democratic participation when at its apex, during a federal election 
campaign. 
The point was not lost on Major J., whose dissenting opinion stressed four 
points. First, he emphasized that the activity in question was invaluable, given its 
significance in the political process, and that the Court therefore should tread 
lightly in limiting such expression.24 Second, he noted that the Attorney General 
provided little or no evidence to show that not enforcing the legislation would have 
harmful consequences. For years, he observed, federal elections proceeded without 
restrictions and likewise without calamitous consequences.25 In the absence of 
“anything beyond speculation” and “in the face of a serious denial of Charter-
protected freedoms,” Mr. Justice Major had little doubt that the balance of 
convenience favoured an injunction.26 
Third, he commented that the sequence of events between enactment of the law 
and the election call enabled the government to immunize the third party 
provisions from “meaningful constitutional scrutiny.”27 Hence his concern that, 
absent an injunction to halt enforcement of a law that might ultimately be declared 
unconstitutional, affected citizens would be left without a remedy. The majority 
opinion resisted the injunction on the further ground that an interlocutory remedy 
would grant the law‟s challengers a substantial measure of success when the case 
was heard on its merits. Not only did that argument cut both ways, Major J. 
observed, but the timing of the legislation and the election call were both entirely 
within the government‟s control. In such circumstances, the plaintiff could hardly 
be faulted for seeking an injunction to enforce his rights. To conclude, Mr. Justice 
Major adopted the following words as “apt,” from Sopinka and Cory JJ. in RJR-
MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General): “[f]or the courts to insist rigidly 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Canada had called “no evidence” on the harm that would result from suspending the operation of the law. 
Harper, supra, note 5, at para. 6. 
22
 Id., at para. 11. 
23
 Id., at para. 9 (adding that “only in clear cases will interlocutory injunctions against the 
enforcement of a law on ground of alleged unconstitutionality succeed”). 
24
 Id., at para. 20. 
25
 Id., at paras. 23-25. 
26
 Id., at para. 25. 
27
 Id., at para. 29. 
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that all legislation be enforced to the letter until the moment that it is struck down” 
could “condone the most blatant violation of Charter rights.”28 
It is disheartening that the Court‟s decision on the interlocutory motion 
anticipated its view of the merits. Though Chief Justice Fraser indicated, in the 
Alberta Court of Appeal, that Libman was not dispositive of the Canada Elections 
Act provisions at issue in Harper, it strains credulity to believe that the referendum 
case was not on the Supreme Court‟s mind.29 There, in an act of judicial fiat, the 
Court effectively overruled the Alberta Court of Appeal‟s decision in Somerville v. 
Canada (Attorney General).30 Significantly, though, Somerville was never 
appealed, the evidence and record were not before the Supreme Court in Libman, 
and referenda and parliamentary elections, while similar, may not be identical for 
purposes of section 2(b). For those reasons, Libman‟s strong comments about 
Somerville demonstrated a remarkable inattention to due process on the Court‟s 
part. Even so, in deciding Harper the Court was unlikely to retreat from Libman‟s 
position that strict limits on third party participation are justifiable. Chief Justice 
Fraser was right in principle that Libman should not have been dispositive of 
Harper; it appears to the contrary, however, that it likely was. 
2. Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada31 
Little Sisters presented overwhelming evidence that Canada Customs had 
engaged in the systematic targeting of goods headed for a Vancouver bookstore 
because of animus toward the gay community. Given the extreme and prolonged 
nature of the breach, the Supreme Court had little choice but to acknowledge the 
“serious dimension” of the issue. Early in his majority opinion, Binnie J. agreed 
that Little Sisters was entitled to relief that “goes beyond registering an act of faith 
in the continuance of the [customs] department‟s expressed good intentions.”32 
Incongruously, though, once having fully appreciated the infringement, he found it 
unnecessary to grant an effective remedy.  
On the merits, Mr. Justice Binnie acknowledged that “freedom of expression 
does not stop at the border,” and opined that it is fundamentally unacceptable for 
_______________________________________________________________ 
28
 Id., at para. 35 (quoting RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 
311, at 333-34). 
29
 Harper v. Canada (Attorney General) (2000), 266 A.R. 262, at 264 (C.A.) (stating that 
Libman is not dispositive, given a new statutory regime with a different scope and sweep than the 
legislation considered in Somerville) (Alberta Court of Appeal). 
30
 Libman v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569, at para. 79 (stating, for the full 
Court, that “we cannot accept the Alberta Court of Appeal‟s point of view [in Somerville (1996), 136 
D.L.R. (4th) 205] because we disagree with its conclusion”).  
31
 [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120 (Iacobucci, Arbour and LeBel JJ., concurring, and dissenting in part). 
32
 Id., at para. 38. 
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expression which is free within the country to become stigmatized and harassed by 
government officials, “simply because it crosses an international boundary, and is 
thereby brought within the bailiwick of the Customs department.”33 On the 
question of remedy, he agreed that “[t]he operation of the statutory scheme ... 
created a barrier to free expression that exceeded the government‟s legitimate 
objectives,” but added that the violation “is a matter for regulatory or 
administrative action not necessarily legislative action.”34 Thus he held that the 
statutory scheme, “properly implemented by the government within the powers 
granted by Parliament, was capable of being administered with minimal 
impairment” to the rights of importers.35 In his view, a distinction should be drawn 
between legislation that is valid on its face and provisions that are administered in 
a way that violates the Charter. As a result, the faulty implementation of a statute 
may require correction, but it does not compromise the statute itself: “[a] failure at 
the implementation level ... can be addressed at the implementation level.”36 
Ultimately, then, Mr. Justice Binnie found it a sufficient remedy that “[t]he views 
of the Court on the merits of the appellants‟ complaints ... are recorded in these 
reasons” and that the Court‟s findings “should provide … a solid platform from 
which to launch any further action” necessary to ensure the protection of the 
bookstore‟s rights.37 In other words, the majority‟s reasons in Little Sisters were an 
adequate disincentive to the further commission of constitutional violations by 
customs officials. 
The dissent on the question of remedy in Little Sisters marks the first time 
members of the Court have expressed strong disapproval of prior restraint.38 
Though Iacobucci J. was not previously known as an advocate of expressive 
freedom, he did not flinch in Little Sisters from insisting that Parliament be 
obligated under the Charter to institute procedural protections against the regime of 
prior restraint at the border.39 His response to the question of remedy was informed 
_______________________________________________________________ 
33
 Little Sisters, supra, note 31, at para. 124; parenthetically, it should be noted that the Court 
rejected the contention that same-sex materials should be treated differently, or even exempted, under the 
Butler test; see paras. 66-68 (per Binnie J.) and paras. 194-99 (per Iacobucci J.). 
34
 Id., at para. 150 (emphasis in original). 
35
 Id. (emphasis added). 
36
 Id., at para 82. 
37
 Id., at para. 158. Note that the Court found the statute‟s reverse onus clause unconstitutional, 
because it required the importer to establish that the proferred goods are not obscene. The Court held, 
instead, that the burden of proving obscenity must rest on the Crown and its customs agents. 
38
 Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 constitutionalized the 
common law of publication bans, but did so without emphasizing that such bans are a form of prior 
restraint. 
39
 But see Haig v. Canada; Haig v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 995 
(dissenting opinion defending voting rights in the Charlottetown referendum), and Ramsden v. 
Peterborough (City), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 1084 (invalidating an absolute prohibition on postering). 
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by his conception of the entitlement and of the severity of the breach. Of 
expressive freedom he stated, “[i]f such a fundamental right is to be restricted, it 
must be done with care,” and added, “[t]his is particularly the case when the nature 
of the interference is one of prior restraint, not subsequent silencing through 
criminal sanction.”40 Likewise, it is evident from his reasons that Iacobucci J.‟s 
dissent was animated by a keen sense of the injustice suffered by the Little Sisters 
bookstore. That sense of injustice prompted him to stress that “[f]reedom of speech 
means not just the right to question the dominant political structure, but to question 
the dominant society and culture.”41 Declaratory relief being inadequate in the 
circumstances, Iacobucci J. concluded that it was appropriate to strike the Tariff 
Code provision42 and propose options for Parliament to consider in bringing its 
system of border inspection into compliance with the Charter.43 
In disagreeing on the remedial issue, Binnie J. noted that facial invalidity and 
the unconstitutional administration of a valid law represent two different kinds of 
infringments. As far as he was concerned, a law valid on its face could not become 
unconstitutional because of defects in its operation. More particularly, Mr. Justice 
Binnie concluded that a stronger remedy was inappropriate for three reasons. First, 
he attached significance to the border context, stating that the “concern with prior 
restraint ... operates in such circumstances, if at all, with much reduced 
importance.”44 Second, he was hesitant to act in Little Sisters, given that Charter 
abuses lurk everywhere: “[w]hile there is evidence of actual abuse here, there is the 
potential for abuse in many areas, and a rule requiring Parliament to enact in each 
case special procedures for the protection of Charter rights would be unnecessarily 
rigid.”45 Third, unwilling to grant a remedy under section 52(1), Binnie J. could not 
see how a section 24 remedy could practicably be granted in the circumstances. 
Yet, after such a long saga of harassment and litigation, it hardly seems fair to fault 
Little Sisters for not presenting a ready-made solution that could simply be adopted 
by the Court.46 
In the end the majority‟s solution to the violation of the bookstore‟s rights was 
formalistic and unresponsive to the breach. Denying an effective remedy 
unavoidably discounts the dangers, so graphically revealed by the facts of Little 
Sisters, that are inherent in any system of prior restraint. By contrast, the dissent 
_______________________________________________________________ 
40
 Little Sisters, supra, note 31, at para. 231. 
41
 Id., at para. 274. 
42
  Customs Tariff, S.C. 1987, c. 49, Sched. VII, Code 9956(a) (now Tariff Item 9989.00.00). 
43
 Little Sisters, supra, note 31, at paras. 258-83. 
44
 Id., at para. 78. 
45
 Id., at para. 137 (emphasis in original). 
46
 Id., at para. 157 (announcing that “we have not been informed by the appellants of the 
specific measures (short of declaring the legislation invalid or inoperative) that ... would remedy any 
continuing problems”). 
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grasped the vital link between the substantive and procedural elements of the 
entitlement; in doing so, it recognized that the constitutional guarantee would count 
for little if section 2(b) materials could be turned back by administrative censorship 
at the border. Binnie J. need not have worried that granting a remedy would 
implicate other valid laws which are imperfectly implemented, because the dissent 
made it plain that Little Sisters was specific to section 2(b) and the particular 
dangers associated with prior restraint.  
The systematic targeting of this or any gay bookstore could not have been 
justified under any view of the Charter. And that, ultimately, is why Little Sisters is 
disappointing. The majority opinion handled the easy issues well enough, and then 
faltered at the critical moment. When faced with a choice between exercising its 
authority to prevent the egregious violation of rights in the future, and leaving well 
enough alone — with only its own opinion as enforcement — the Court chose the 
path of least institutional resistance. Whether Little Sisters or other importers of 
expressive materials falling outside the mainstream are now safe from censorship is 
a matter of speculation. The point is that, in principle, they should not be required 
to bear that risk under a constitutional guarantee of expressive freedom.  
3. R. v. Sharpe47 
Though the two lower courts found Parliament‟s child pornography law unjustifiable, 
and Charter advocates from a variety of constituencies spoke out against it, the Court 
would have found it enormously difficult, in political terms, to invalidate the 
legislation. It is perhaps no coincidence, then, that the Court‟s majority opinion 
declaring the law constitutional was authored by Chief Justice McLachlin, who has 
defended expressive freedom in the past.48 In reaching the conclusion that the 
Criminal Code‟s child pornography provisions are a justifiable limit on expressive 
freedom, she strained to render the law responsive to section 2(b)‟s command of 
expressive freedom.  
Meantime, three members of the Court resisted any temptation to compromise, 
and made an appeal to principle instead. If their separate reasons are entitled to 
respect for that reason, the opinion nonetheless presents a disturbing conception of 
expressive freedom. There is no mistaking their hostility toward section 2(b), and 
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that is why their views should be challenged. In the absence of a critical analysis, 
there is a risk their assumptions about expressive freedom might attain majority 
support at some point in the future. 
Initially, the judges expressed disappointment that the Crown had conceded the 
issue of breach. Although their opinion recognized that there was no basis in 
precedent for any conclusion that child pornography can be excluded from section 
2(b), that did not deter them from hinting that the scope of the right could be 
revisited.49 The minority‟s invitation to reconceptualize and reduce the scope of 
section 2(b) is a daring and unwelcome development. Apart from questions of 
access to public property, the suggestion has not been broached by any member of 
the Court for several years. 
From there, the judges applied a methodology that sought to undercut section 
2(b)‟s values at every stage of the analysis. For instance, they invoked Dagenais 
for the proposition that freedom of expression should be read against section 15‟s 
guarantee of equality and section 7‟s security of the person.50 Yet, far from being 
consistent with the Dagenais rule that the Charter‟s guarantees be given a non-
hierarchical interpretation, the assertion was made in Sharpe, as elsewhere, to 
rationalize a kind of paramount status under the Charter for equality.51 The 
difficulty is that there is no textual basis for rendering some constitutional 
entitlements contingent on or subordinate to others. If Charter rights are truly co-
equal, as Dagenais maintained, then freedom of expression cannot be read down to 
accommodate equality. 
Additionally, the minority‟s reasons undermined section 2(b) in at least three 
significant ways. First, the judges stated that expressive freedom can be limited 
even though the harm it causes cannot be measured. In other words, 
constitutionally protected activity can be restricted, though the harm may be 
speculative and even fanciful, as long as its content is perceived to be harmful.52 
Thus the judges stated that the Court had “broadened the traditional individualistic 
notion of harm, and recognized that all members of society suffer when harmful 
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attitudes are reinforced.”53 A constitutional guarantee of expressive freedom cannot 
be strangled by subjective perceptions of which attitudes and beliefs are good or bad, 
and the problem is not solved by adding the qualifying language of “harm” or 
“harmful” to what, under this view, contemplates the criminalization of socially 
unacceptable attitudes.  
Second, the minority opinion relied on the vulnerability of children and their 
subjective fears to justify the legislation.54 There is no argument that children are 
vulnerable and can be the victims of sexual crimes, but that does not mean section 2(b)‟s 
guarantee should be contingent on the “subjective fears” of others. Applying evidence 
that expressive activity causes harm is one matter, and granting the subjective fears or 
perceptions of third parties a power to censor unwelcome ideas, attitudes or views is 
another. A third party prerogative to veto the speaker and control her rights under the 
Charter is inconsistent with the fundamental assumptions of section 2(b) and Irwin Toy.  
Third, the minority opinion placed heavy reliance on any number of statutes and 
instruments, domestic as well as international, which address and protect the 
interests of children.55 The point in doing so was to tip the balance under section 1 
yet more conclusively against expressive freedom. Not only are such materials of 
limited relevance in determining the justifiability of particular Criminal Code 
provisions which must pass the different branches of Oakes in their own right, the 
Court should exercise caution in relying on international instruments which have 
not been incorporated into domestic law.  
To summarize, at every phase in the analysis, the dissenting opinion advanced 
and relied on principles of interpretation that were designed to minimize the 
Charter‟s protection of expressive freedom. In the end, perhaps most dangerous of 
all is the minority‟s emphasis on the negligible value of the expressive activity.56 
Child pornography may be without merit but that is beside the point; the relevant 
question under section 1 is whether it causes a demonstrable harm that can be 
justifiably limited. While highlighting the need to prevent children from harm, the 
minority opinion essentially took the view that all sexual expression involving 
children is harmful because it is worthless. Citing Lucas in particular, the judges 
maintained that the criminal provisions must be upheld because it would be a 
mistake to give preference to “abstract notions of the value of expression in a 
democracy when the activity at issue does not serve [our democratic] values.”57 
Under that view, however, expressive freedom has no value in principle, and is 
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only worthy of protection when its content is deemed valuable. With respect, 
section 2(b)‟s guarantee is not based on an assumption that all expression is or 
must be valuable; rather, it is based on the assumption that, unless and until it 
causes harm, the freedom to engage in expressive activity is itself valuable. 
Though the minority‟s reasons did not prevail, their opinion should be read with 
foreboding. By comparison, if the majority opinion is disappointing for other 
reasons, at least it avoided the values methodology of the past. To her credit, the 
Chief Justice countered the dissent by reinforcing the principle of content 
neutrality and substituting a harm-based analysis for an approach that depended on 
subjective perceptions of the expressive activity‟s value.58  
Otherwise, the Chief Justice‟s opinion was pragmatic in the sense of balancing 
the demands of the Charter against the institutional price that would have been paid 
for striking the legislation down. Thus she demonstrated concern for expressive 
freedom, but did so unconvincingly in light of her conclusion that the law was 
valid under section 1. There were two central issues in Sharpe: the first was 
whether the legislation had to fail due to concerns related to vagueness, 
overbreadth and minimal impairment; and the second was whether Parliament 
could criminalize the simple possession of materials that fell within the statute‟s 
definition of child pornography.59 On the question of breadth and vagueness, 
Parliament had been put on notice of flaws in the legislation before it was enacted, 
but forged ahead anyway.60 Subsequently, both lower courts in Sharpe invalidated 
the provisions.61 By the time of the Supreme Court hearing, interventions by 
interested parties, both formal and informal, had placed the scope and breadth of 
the provisions directly in issue.  
Against that backdrop, Chief Justice McLachlin quickly deflated critics of the 
law by explaining that Parliament‟s legislation revealed a high degree of respect 
for expressive freedom.62 Given the legislation‟s expeditious enactment, the 
suggestion that Parliament acted in bona fide concern for expressive freedom is 
open to question. Just the same, the assertion that Parliament had been “[m]indful 
of the importance of freedom of expression ... and the dangers of vague, overbroad 
legislation in the criminal sphere” enabled McLachlin C.J.C. to save the legislation 
through an elaborate exercise in statutory interpretation.63 In particular, by placing 
the focus on the law‟s construction, the majority opinion deflected attention from 
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more fundamental questions as to its constitutionality. Seen that way, the approach 
taken in Sharpe is slightly reminiscent of Sopinka J.‟s analysis in R. v. Butler. 
There, too, an extended discussion of the judiciary‟s interpretation of the definition 
of obscenity in section 163(8) of the Criminal Code rendered the subsequent 
resolution of constitutional issues under the Charter a foregone conclusion.64 
Likewise, in Sharpe much of the analysis was completed by the time McLachlin 
C.J.C. reached the critical question of whether the simple possession of materials 
caught by a zealous definition of child pornography could be punished by a jail 
sentence. In this way, a substantial part of the majority opinion in Sharpe displaced 
constitutional analysis in favour of statutory construction. 
Second, having concluded that Parliament had achieved its purpose in 
addressing the “dual concerns” of protecting children and protecting free 
expression, the Court turned to the question of possession.65 One of the crucial 
issues there was the way harm is defined under section 1, and the evidence that 
is needed to support a rational connection between the possession of proscribed 
materials and the exploitation of children. Throughout the majority opinion, 
McLachlin C.J.C. appropriately focused on the expressive activity‟s harm, and 
not its relative lack of value. Still, her definition of harm was broad and to some 
extent lacking in rigour.66 It may be unarguable that some forms of child 
pornography cause harm that can justifiably be prevented; it is a different 
question whether all the materials included in Parliament‟s definition are 
harmful enough to attract the criminal sanction. In the absence of a principled 
approach to the definition of harm and rational connection, substituting a harm-
based approach for a values methodology achieves little.67  
Third, in the result the Chief Justice‟s majority concluded that two exemptions 
should be read in to address the constitutionality of the possession provision, at the 
margins of its application, where the legislation was “peripherally problematic.”68 
_______________________________________________________________ 
64
 R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452. For a comment on that specific aspect of Butler, see 
Cameron, “Abstract Principle and Contextual Conceptions of Harm: A Comment on R. v. Butler” 
(1992), 37 McGill L.J. 1135, at 1141-44. 
65
 Sharpe, supra, note 47, at para. 74. 
66
 Thus she stated that “[c]omplex human behaviour may not lend itself to precise scientific 
demonstration” and that “the courts cannot hold Parliament to a higher standard of proof than the subject 
matter admits of”; those observations led the Chief Justice to conclude that social science evidence, 
“buttressed by experience and common sense” meets the requirements of a rational connection. Sharpe, 
supra, note 47, at paras. 89, 94. 
67
 See Cameron, “The Past, Present, and Future of Expressive Freedom under the Charter” 
(1997), 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1 (criticizing Mr. Justice Sopinka‟s opinion in Butler for claiming that the 
decision was based on a harm-based approach when it was clear, from his reasons, that the Court upheld 
limits on obscenity because it is considered of low value and detrimental to gender equality). 
68
 R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45, at para. 111. Accordingly, she read in remedies for “Self-
created expressive material” and “Private recordings of lawful sexual activity”, at para. 115. 
82 Supreme Court Law Review (2001), 14 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
 
 
While less controversial than a declaration of invalidity would have been, that 
approach cheats the constitutional entitlement. Not only that, in drafting 
exemptions to protect privacy interests, the Court approached the margins of its 
own institutional role. It is anything but clear that the Court should be reassuring 
Parliament that attention to draftsmanship is unimportant because the judges can be 
counted on to fix errors caused by expedience or a callous disregard of Charter 
rights. 
The majority opinion in Sharpe can be seen as a valiant compromise between 
concern for expressive freedom and a strong instinct to quell the sexual 
exploitation of children. On the positive side, the Court‟s pragmatic reconstruction 
of the legislation minimizes the risk that the child pornography provisions will be 
applied to expression that is protected by the Charter. As well, without explicitly 
abandoning it, the majority opinion broke ranks with the minority and declined to 
apply the values methodology of the pre-millennium period. Even so, and despite 
the judge-made privacy exemptions, possession remains an offence, and that has 
implications for section 2(b). Moreover, it seems doubftul that the Chief Justice‟s 
commitment to principle is as vital as in the past.69 That is unfortunate, for section 
2(b) is greatly in need of, and still lacking, a champion on the Court. It is also 
unfortunate that pragmatic considerations led the Court to uphold legislation twice 
struck down in the courts below. Whether Parliament can criminalize child 
pornography is not the question, as it surely can; the point is that expressive 
freedom can only be protected when Parliament is held to an adequate standard of 
justification under section 1.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Positive signals can be found in the millennium trilogy. For example, the 
majorities in Little Sisters and Sharpe unquestionably made an effort to 
accommodate expressive freedom. As well, it is possible, though not a certainty 
at this point in time, that the values methodology, which evolved and then 
dominated in the 1990s, is now falling out of favour. Finally, dissenting opinions 
indicating a stronger resolve on section 2(b) issues were registered in Harper 
and Little Sisters. 
On the merits, optimists can hope that the majority opinion in Little Sisters 
provided a sufficient warning from the Court that the constitutional violations that 
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occurred at the border will not be tolerated in the future. By the same token, the 
Chief Justice‟s insistence in Sharpe that the child pornography provisions were 
carefully drafted to exclude constitutionally protected expression may adequately 
deter any overreaching in the application of the law. Should those predictions be 
confirmed, that would leave Harper as the least supportive decision, among the 
three, of expressive freedom. 
Whereas Sharpe and Little Sisters each acknowledged the value of expressive 
freedom, language along similar lines in Harper can only be found in Major J.‟s 
dissent. Granted, the Court should be vigilant when Parliament criminalizes 
expressive activity, or acquiesces in the extreme and discriminatory interference 
with constitutional rights that occurred at the Canada-United States border in Little 
Sisters. Still, political expression and the right to participate in a federal election 
campaign were at stake in Harper. Though the issue came before the Court by way 
of interlocutory proceedings, it is difficult to conclude that the majority was not 
influenced by Libman in lifting the injunction against enforcement of the Canada 
Elections Act. In light of the link between expressive freedom and self-government, 
the Supreme Court‟s approach to the question of third party participation requires a 
more rights-based conception of democratic governance than that adopted in 
Libman.  
Despite the positive indications, these decisions are unsatisfying at the end of 
the day. There can be no quibble that the Court must be mindful of institutional 
relations in interpreting the Charter. At the same time, there can likewise be little 
doubt that pragmatic decision-making is appropriate and desirable. The issue, 
though, is whether principle has been pushed aside to make room for compromises 
that create the appearance of balanced decision-making but reveal undue deference 
to Parliament. The Court‟s willingness to sacrifice principle to consensual views 
about the relative worth of expressive activity, unfortunately, was one of the 
hallmarks of the pre-millennium jurisprudence. On the basis of this first trilogy of 
decisions, and notwithstanding that some steps forward have been taken, it appears 
that the Supreme Court of Canada remains hesitant to grant section 2(b)‟s 
guarantee of expressive freedom a principled interpretation. 
Freedom of expression requires leadership for its protection. It is not realistic to 
expect the leadership and moral courage to tolerate unconventional or offensive 
views to come from the democratic branches of government, as they are under 
constant pressure to sanitize public discourse and criminalize the ideas we fear. 
That is why the impetus to protect expressive freedom must come from the 
Supreme Court of Canada, and that is also why the millennium trilogy can only be 
seen as a disappointment. 
